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An International But Especially
American Event
Jacques Sémelin
Centre d’études et de recherches internationales (CERI),
Sciences Po, Paris, France
The report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force (the Albright-Cohen Report),
prepared under the auspices of the US Institute of Peace (USIP), is of great
significance to the field of genocide studies. I do not hesitate to say that this report is
an international event. Indeed, this is the first time that a group of experts—mainly
former high officials, former diplomats, generals, and members of Congress—have
worked together to propose a coherent and well-argued list of recommendations to a
state so that its government can play a major role in preventing genocide throughout
the world. One may certainly regret that so few genocide scholars and NGO members
were consulted; it seems clear that the report has been written for a public policy
audience rather than an academic audience. Nevertheless, to my knowledge, there
has been no equivalent document—directed to a particular state rather than to an
organization such as the United Nations—in the young field of genocide studies or
in international affairs. In particular, such reports cannot currently be found in the
United Kingdom or in France.
Above all, this report is an American event, since the Genocide Prevention Task
Force recommendations have been formulated mainly by American experts to convince
the current American administration (that of President Barack Obama) to implement
policy in the field of genocide prevention. As its subtitle indicates, the report is
intended to be a ‘‘blueprint for U.S. policymakers.’’1 However, to grasp the significance
of such an initiative, let us consider a broader vision of its historical importance,
keeping in mind all the past failures of states in general, and the United States
especially, to prevent and to stop genocide. This is why the Genocide Prevention Task
Force is an ‘‘answer’’ or, at least, a follow-up to Samantha Power’s famous 2002 book,
‘‘A Problem from Hell’’: America and the Age of Genocide.2 Power’s book analyzes the
constant passivity of the US government in the face of ongoing genocides throughout
the twentieth century, including the Holocaust. To some extent, the Genocide
Prevention Task Force was a way for America to say ‘‘never again’’: never again will
America maintain a position of passivity.
Now, the question is: Is this report convincing to its target audience? In the field of
genocide prevention, one too often reads generous statements and wishful thinking.
This is not at all the case with the Albright-Cohen Report, whose goal is to be accurate
and realistic as well as well balanced. All the report’s vocabulary comes from strategic
studies and international affairs. In this respect, the Task Force brings the debate on
genocide prevention from the margins to the mainstream of foreign affairs. There is
a price to be paid for this: the report’s terminology is sometimes bureaucratic, in order,
I assume, to convince key members of the US administration to take action on genocide
prevention.
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Interestingly enough, the task force has decided to distance itself from the legal
definition of genocide (as it is accepted and recognized by the 1948 UN Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, or UNCG). This is a
wise decision, not only because this definition is a matter of endless debate and
controversy among genocide scholars but also because the legal definition protects only
four kinds of groups. Furthermore, the legal definition places those who want to
prevent genocide in a deep contradiction: as soon as lethal violence against civilian
populations is legally recognized as the crime of genocide, it is by definition too late
to prevent it.
But is the expression ‘‘mass atrocities,’’ from the legal expert David Scheffer,
the most appropriate choice for enlarging the notion? This is matter of debate
as well. Faced with the same problem of definition, the steering committee of
the Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence (OEMV) finally decided on the expression
‘‘mass violence,’’ which was perceived as more neutral and general. The term is used to
refer to
human phenomena of collective destructiveness which are primarily due to political,
social, religious or cultural causes. This category excludes natural disasters
and technological accidents from the start. The notion of ‘‘mass violence’’ does
not coincide with the armed combat inherent in war, but rather with all violence
which directly or indirectly affects civilian populations, either in times of war or
of peace.3

Thus, ‘‘mass violence’’ covers genocide, ethnic cleansing, massacre, and other sorts of
lethal human behaviors that qualify as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
crimes of genocide.
In the Albright-Cohen Report, another problem of definition is posed by the scope
of genocide prevention, or, more exactly, of limiting the definition. Is genocide
prevention—a sort of diplomatic and strategic policy—fully autonomous or is it, rather,
linked to the more general field of crisis prevention? Since genocide is considered in
broader terms, the second option is much more satisfactory. But here we have another
vocabulary issue: Are we dealing with conflict prevention or crisis prevention? The first
formulation, often used in peace studies, is rather problematic, given that conflict is
inherent to life. The expression ‘‘crisis prevention’’ is therefore much better and more
realistic: prevention is aimed at ensuring that a given conflict does not evolve into
a crisis that might generate mass violence. In other words, genocide prevention is
‘‘simply’’ a particular dimension of crisis prevention. While the report sometimes refers
to ‘‘conflict prevention’’ in general terms, ‘‘crisis prevention’’ is used more frequently,
including in the report’s summary. In my opinion, this is a good choice.
After reading the report, it is hard not to share its general argument: when mass
violence is rising in a given conflict, between the two extremes of passivity and military
intervention, a range of initiatives can be undertaken. This is exactly what the
Genocide Prevention Task Force was about. Their report formulates interesting
thoughts and recommendations, and raises critical issues and debates. I will focus
my comments below on the report’s primary affirmation, recommendations, and
assumption.

I.
One of the basic arguments of the Albright-Cohen Report, if not its main argument, is
that genocide prevention is in America’s national interest and is not purely a
humanitarian concern or a human-rights issue. Within the first few pages of the report
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we find this solemn sentence: ‘‘As Americans consider our country’s role in the world in
the years to come, we are convinced that the U.S. government can and must do more to
prevent genocide, a crime that threatens not only our values, but our national
interests’’ (ix). To justify this strong affirmation, the report notes that genocidal
situations are deeply linked with major internal conflict or the taking of power by more
radical or more harshly authoritarian leaders, which generates regional instability
and an influx of refugees. Consequently, these crises
feed on and fuel other threats in weak and corrupt states, with dangerous spillover
effects that know no boundaries. If the United States does not engage early in
preventing these crimes, we inevitably bear greater costs—in feeding millions of
refugees and trying to manage long-lasting regional crises. (xvi)

In other words, even if US policy makers have no desire to become engaged in
situations that lead to genocide, they are inevitably forced to cope with them. On this
basis, the authors assert that it is in the US national interest to contribute to
ensuring that these situations do not escalate.
This interesting argument has already been supported by earlier reports
advocating that the international community should play a major role in preventing
such crises in order to limit the burden of their aftermath.4 However, the specificity of
the Albright-Cohen Report is to underline the particular responsibility of the United
States. But the argument correlating genocidal threat and US national interests is
repeated so many times that one may wonder whether the authors really believe it.
It is regrettable that the report does not really discuss current case studies. Let us
take the example of the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Partly a consequence of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, this armed conflict has led the
deaths of at least 4 million people. But can we seriously prove that this lethal crisis has
threatened, and is threatening, American interests? I doubt that many US security
experts really believe in such a threat.
It took me a long time to admit, as a genocide scholar, that states are not really
interested in preventing genocide as long as their own populations are not targeted; in
other words, they are not really concerned about rescuing foreign people. This is
simply not their priority, unless they can profit from such actions for other purposes
(economic gains, a military presence in the region, etc).
Does this mean that the ‘‘national argument’’ put forward in the Albright-Cohen
Report is not relevant at all? That would be too simplistic a conclusion. Yet this
argument will be acceptable only if it coincides with the desire of the United States to
assume a leadership role as a great power in this highly sensitive issue, eager to deter
‘‘Hell on Earth’’—that is, genocide. Inevitably, however, this would require America to
embrace, yet again, the role of the moral leader against evil, standing at the head of
the civilized world . . .

II.
A main recommendation of the Albright-Cohen Report is that ‘‘the president should
demonstrate that preventing genocide and . . . mass atrocities is a national priority’’ (6).
Consequently, ‘‘the administration should develop and promulgate a governmentwide policy on preventing genocide and mass atrocities’’; this would involve creating ‘‘a
standing interagency mechanism for [the] analysis of threats of genocide and mass
atrocities and consideration of appropriate preventive action’’ (111).
The report also suggests that ‘‘the national security advisor and the director of
national intelligence should establish genocide early warning as a formal priority for
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the intelligence community as a means to improve reporting and assessments on the
potential for genocide and mass atrocities’’ (112):
The State Department and the intelligence community should incorporate training on
early warning of genocide and mass atrocities into programs for foreign service and
intelligence officers and analysts. (112)

Finally, the task force proposes that
Congress appropriate an additional $250 million annually to the international affairs
budget to finance initiatives to prevent genocide and mass atrocities in countries
at risk. This additional investment—less than a dollar for every American each year—
would not only support valuable individual projects, but also provide focus for foreign
policy professionals engaged in high-risk countries. (11)

This very ambitious plan is fully coherent with the report’s main statement
(see above). For the first time, American policy makers have at their disposal a
range of measures to implement genocide-prevention policy.
As a European scholar, I am not able to assess the relevance of these
recommendations in the American political system. Certainly, the efforts of the task
force are unprecedented; but can this impressive body of political, administrative, and
financial proposals replace a lack of political will on the part of a given government?
For example, let us take the case of early warnings. The Albright-Cohen Report
suggests an inter-agency mechanism, including the creation of a list of countries under
watch. But that kind of information is already provided by some NGOs, such as the
International Crisis Group, founded after the Rwandan genocide for precisely that
purpose. Similarly, genocide scholars already know more or less which countries are at
risk. In January 2004, for instance, delegates from fifty-five nations at the Conference
on Genocide Prevention, organized by Sweden, showed themselves to be well aware of
these dangers, although the results of their work have gone almost unnoticed.
According to their research, there was a risk of genocide in thirteen countries: Sudan,
Myanmar/Burma, Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC, Somalia, Uganda, Algeria, China, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Ethiopia.5
It would be fine if the United States established its own list and improved its own
system of early warning by taking genocidal threats into account. Nevertheless, the
critical issue is not establishing the most sophisticated early warning mechanism but
acting or to reacting in a timely manner on the basis of the information that
mechanism would provide.
Let us hope that if the current US administration decides to implement the report’s
recommendations, this will improve the analysis of crises by creating a ‘‘culture of
genocide prevention’’ that would give decision makers a wider range of options at the
early stages.

III.
Finally, the most important question must not be forgotten: What kind of decision or
action would have a preventive effect? The entire work of the Genocide Prevention
Task Force relies on the assumption that genocide is preventable. Having compared
three cases (the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Bosnia) in my book Purify and Destroy, I have
come to more or less the same conclusion.6 Fortunately, genocide is not the result of
ancient hatred but, rather, a process that tends to instrumentalize ethnic and religious
tensions. Theoretically, and possibly in practice, this process can be interrupted.
164
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But the longer one waits, the worse it becomes. There are now hundreds of books on
the passivity of the international community.
However, it is one thing to state that genocide can be prevented and another to
determine the most judicious actions that might have a preventive effect in a given
crisis. The Albright-Cohen Report notes that ‘‘action before or at an early stage of a
crisis holds the greatest promise’’ (2). But action of what kind? There is simply no
discussion in the report of what can be—or not be—effective. Rather, the report
presumes that since genocide is most often planned, it can be interrupted by countermeasures. This general affirmation needs to be challenged. In theory it is correct, but
the reality is much more complicated. While the report acknowledges the existence of a
degree of uncertainty, policy making gives no guarantee of what the short and longterm effects may be. The outcome may be the opposite of what was expected.
The consequence of this unpredictability? We may suspect that prescribed
initiatives, whether modest or ambitious, will not bring about the anticipated effects.
Intellectuals seeking to exert an antidotal influence on a discourse of hatred may, of
course, be acting in good faith. But it can also happen, against their wishes or through
clumsiness, that their words ultimately increase tension rather than diffusing it.
In the same way, the effectiveness of using economic sanctions against regimes
accused of serious violations of human rights is also hotly debated, because of the
harmful effects such sanctions can have on local populations; the sanctions taken
against Iraq under Saddam Hussein are often cited as an example. Still more
concretely, NGOs or states intervening in crises with the laudable intention of
restraining or halting massacres cannot control the effects of their interventions,
because they may not be best placed to intervene. In other cases, their knowledge of
the realities of the country is limited, their actions may not have the desired impact, or
their actions could even provoke the opposite effect of the one intended. The case of the
American intervention in Somalia in 1992 is a well-known example, as is the US-led
intervention in Iraq to bring down the regime of Saddam Hussein. It is regrettable that
the report does not really discuss these different case studies from the 1990s to assess
the relevance of potential preventive actions.
!!!
I wish to add two final remarks on this important report. Its last chapter suggests
several possibilities in the field of international cooperation. The task force appears to
endorse the UN doctrine of the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ in general terms. However, it
clearly recommends the creation, under US leadership, of an international network
dedicated to genocide prevention:‘‘The secretary of state should launch a major
diplomatic initiative to create among like-minded governments, international
organizations, and NGOs a formal network dedicated to the prevention of genocide
and mass atrocities’’ (104). Is this not a way to bypass the United Nations? Such an
international network of states and non-state actors could be more effective and
reactive than the formal structure of the United Nations; however, if this network
is indeed controlled by the United States, it will come across other difficulties—the
first being its political legitimacy, since some significant actors will likely refuse to be
part of it.
Nevertheless, let us admit the theoretical scenario that America really becomes the
lead state willing to prevent genocide throughout the world. Such a global commitment
will involve moral consequences and constraints that are particularly difficult for the
United States. If it wants to be consistent, it must also join the 108 states already part
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague; unfortunately, the task force
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does not recommend such a decision. I see a contradiction here: If the United States
wants to have this moral authority in the world, how can it refuse to allow its own
citizens to be judged by the ICC? The argument that Americans should be judged by an
American court cannot be understood abroad, particularly in Europe. It took thirtyeight years for the United States to ratify the 1948 UNCG; let us hope that it will take
much less time to sign the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC.
Finally, the Albright-Cohen Report seems to have been written with the future
administration of Barack Obama in mind. We know that the new president feels
concerned about this issue. However, will he act in the direction suggested by the task
force? Is the US Congress ready to allocate funds for such action? This seems unlikely,
considering the overwhelming responsibilities of the president, who is dealing with so
many extreme difficulties, both domestic and foreign.
But should voicing these criticisms prevent us from trying to do something, and
lead actors to cripple themselves with the very thought of their potentially negative
effects? It is true that, generally speaking, every situation of mass violence may be of
paralyzing complexity, and it is vital to exercise caution and clear-sightedness. But it
is too easy for scholars to criticize those who try to ‘‘do something’’ in the name of the
complexity that it is their job to decipher. Looked at from the point of view of those who
have died in massacres, and of those who still risk the same fate, this position is not
morally tenable. It would, moreover, destroy the very basis for any political or social
action, whatever the objective in view, to argue that because we can never be sure
of the outcome, it is futile to intervene. Any political action in the name of change
or peace would, by definition, be in vain; we would effectively be advocating a
‘‘contemplative immobilism’’ of world misfortunes. Whatever its future impact, the
Albright-Cohen Report will stand as a first and promising step.
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